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[L. A. No. 20939. In Bank. Mar. 21, 1950.) 
Estate of CLARA ROOD AKELEY, Deceased. RUSSELL 
LEMMON, as Executor, etc., et aI., Respondents, T. 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Appellant. 
[1] Wills-Construction-lntention of Testator.-All rules of con-
struction of a will are subordinated to the cardinal rule that 
the will is to be construed according to the intention of the 
testator. (Prob. Code, § 101.) 
[2] Id.-Construction - Avoidance of Intestacy. - Presumptions 
against intestacy are especiaHy applicable in construing residu-
ary clauses of a will, since generally they are employed for 
the purpose of making complete disposition of the testator's 
property. 
[3] Id.-Construction-Avoidance of lntestacy.-Constructions of 
a will leading to intestacy either in whole or in part are not 
generally favored, but will be rejected when the lan~age is 
reasonably effective to dispose of the entire estate; and 
liberal interpretation is employed to that end. 
I 
[4a, 4b] Id.-Construction-Meaning of Words.-Although words 
denoting percentages have a technical meaning and "25 per 
cent" mathematically equals one-fourth of the whole, a will 
bequeathing the residue of the estate in 25 per cent portions 
to three named organizations without making any disposition 
as to the fourth portion may be construed as evidencing an 
[2] See 26 Cal.Jur. 899; 19 Am.Jur. 387. 
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Wills, § 271; [2] Wills, § 286(4); 
[3J Wills, § 286(1); [4J Wills, § 292(7); [5] Wills, § 292(5); 
[6J Wills, § 348; [7] Decedents' Estates, § 1069. 
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intent on the part of the testatrix to dispose of her· estate to 
the three named organizations in equal shares where she was 
unmarried, had no relatives of any degree of kindred, and 
drafted the will herself. 
[6] IcL..;.....Oonstruction-MeaDing of Particular Words.-It is the 
duty of the court so to construe the language of a will that it 
will conform to the testatrix' intention as disclosed by the will 
rather than to defeat such intention by strict adherence to the 
technical sense of particular words, especially where the will 
ia not drawn by an attorney. 
< [6] Id.-Besiduary GUta.-Words in a will of gift of "all the 
, rest; residue and, remainder of my estate" to three named 
organizations, and in the event the bequest was in excess ot 
that permitted by law then to a designated pe1'8On tree ot 
trust for distribution by bm as the testatrix would privately 
indicate, diacloses an intention to dispose of all of the residue 
to the organizations named unless there were legal restrietions 
limiting the amouDt she, could leave to charitj. 
[7] Decedentlf Estatea-DistributioD-Appeal-Who may Appeal. 
-The state ia entitled to appeal from a judgment decreeing 
'., diiitributiOD of an estate to three organizations named in 
a will where it had a possible interest depending OD the 
interpretation of a provision in the will with regard to any 
undistributed portion and hence was a party aggrieved by 
the decree distributing the property otherwise. 
'_ APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
; Angeles County decreeing distribution of an estate. New-
~'", comb Condee, Judge. Aftirmed. 
r' ~> ' 
,t ,:", Fred N. Howser, Attorney General and Elizabeth Miller, 
~;.. Deputy Attorney General for Appellant. 
I:-~i~' Sidney N. Bachtell, B. D~an Clanton and Newby, Hol~er" 
,~. ~ewby for Respondents. ' 
-~.~~! . 
'?t; SHENK; ".-This appeal from the decree of 1lnal distribu-
'. tion presents for consideration the question of the correct-
''':" ness of the probate court's interpretation of the residuary 
, clause in the. will of the decedent . 
. Clara Rood Akeley died on November 1, 1947. She left 
an holographic will dated November 14, 1946, declaring that 
; abe was unmarried and had no living relatives of any degree 
."9f.Jdndred. She made several specific bequests to individuals, 
~'appointed Bussell Lemmon executor, and provided for fur. 
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"Fifth, all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate 
I give and bequeath as follows 
25 per cent to the Childrens Home Society of Calif 
25 per cent to the Mary Martha Home for Git·Is 
632 Brittania Street, Los Angeles Calif 
25 per cent to Los Angeles Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to animals, 3612 11th Ave Los Angeles, In the 
event the total of the bequests to the above 11;1 lIIed Chari-
table organizations shall exceed the portion of my Estate 
that I may legally give for charitable purposes, then all 
such bequests shall be proportionately reduced to the 
extent, that the total of such bequests shall not exceed the 
maximum amount that I may legally give to Charity, 
and in such event, I give devise and bequeath to Russell 
Lemmon the Executive named, all the residue of my 
estate, free from Trust, But with the request that he shall 
distribute the same in such manner, as I shall have indi-
cated to him. H 
In his petition for distribution the executor alleged an 
uncertainty as to the proper distribution of the residue of 
the estate, and raised the question whether in accordance 
with the manifest intention to dispose of all of the residue 
it should be distributed one-third to each of the named chari-
table organizations; or whether the testatrix died intestate 
as to one-fourth of the residue in which event such portion 
would escheat to the State of California. 
The State of California, through the attorney general, filed 
a statement of claim by escheat to one-fourth of the residue 
of the estate. After a hearing the court found that it was 
the intention and purpose of the testatrix to dispose of all 
of the residue of her estate to the three named organizations 
in equal shares and so ordered distribution of the residue 
which amounts to $41,023.19. 
The State of California appealed, asserting that there is 
no ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of the will but 
that the specific residuary bequests require a finding that the 
testatrix failed to dispose of one-fourth of the residue of her 
estate which is distributable to the State of California as 
escheated property pursuant to section 231 of the Probate 
Code. 
[1] The controlling role is stated in section 101 of the 
Probate Code which provides that a will is to be construed 
according to the intention of the testator. All other rules of 
construction are IRlbordinate to this eardinal rule aud in its 
) 
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application presumptions are to be indulged which will pre-
vent entire or partial intestacy. (Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 
448, 458-459 [108 P. 287].) [2] Presumptions against in-
testacy are especially applicable in construing residuary 
clauses, since generally they are employed for the purpose 
of making complete disposition of the testator's property. 
[3] Constructions leading to intestacy either in whole or in 
part are not generally favored but will be rejected when the 
.'language is reasonably effective to dispose of the entire estate; 
: and liberal interpretation is employed to that end. (O'Connor 
, "f. Murphy, 147 Cal. 148, 153 [81 P. 406] ; Estate of Hoytema, 
., '180 Cal. 430, 432 [181 P. 6451 ; Estate of Beldon, 11 Cal.2d 
;",108, 111 [77 P.2d 1052]; Estate of Northcutt, 16 Cal.2d 683 
~~'[107 P.2d 607]; Estate of Lawrence, 17 Cal.2d 1, 7 [108 P.2d 
i,,' 893].) 
f,~. [4&] Words denoting percentages have a technical meaning 
~and "25 per cent" mathematically equals one-fourth of the 
, ,whole. The attorney general assumes that the probate court 
... was bound by the mathematical percentages specified by the 
. testatrix and that the use of any other language could not 
be deemed to create ambiguity with the specified percentages. 
However, there is no rule of construction which would prevent 
the court from applying the language of a will in accordance 
I' ,with the manifest intention of the testatrix even though to 
, 'do so would require an interpretation not in accord with the 
[,'technical meaning of words used. [5] On the contrary it 
~Js the duty of the court so to construe the language that it 
firill conform to the testatrix' intention as disclosed by the 
f?~ rather than to defeat such intention by strict adherence 
['to the technical sense of particular words. Especially in cases 
'~f:where the will is not drawn by an attorney words which are 
trepugnant to the clear intention disclosed by other parts of 
~:the instrument may be regarded as surplusage or restricted 
tin 'application since to do otherwise would be to defeat the 
; 'Intention. (Estate of Wood, 36 Cal. 75.) 
~~ [6] The attorney general relies on the rule stated on page 
r 112 of Estate of Beldon, supra (11 Ca1.2d) namely: That a 
[',testator has the right to make a will· which does not dispose 
~'.'Ot. all of his property but which leaves a residue to pass to his 
D.l.'. ,6 .. , irs under the laws o. f succession; that such a will is not 
~~e usual one but when the language clearly leads to that 
lresuIt it must be given effect accordingly. The statement is 
F,.apPlicable m the pr"'nt case beeause the testatrix left 
) 
30 ESTATE OF~Y [35 C.2d 
no surviving heirs. The will on its face shows that the un-
married testatrix was fully aware of the fact tha.t she had no 
heirs or relatives, and that she intended to dispose of all of 
her estate. The words of gift of "all the rest, residue and 
remainder of my estate" to the three named organizations, 
and in the event the bequest was in excess of that permitted 
by law then to Russell Lemmon free of trust for distribution 
by him as she would privately indicate, discloses an intention 
to dispose of all of the residue to the organizations named 
unless there were legal restrictions limiting the amount she 
could leave to charity. It is conceded that there were no 
applicable limitations and no relatives have appeared to 
claim any part of the estate. 
[4b] The language showing a purpose and intention to 
dispose of the entire estate, and the use of the specified per-
centages aggregating less than the whole, created an ambigu-
ity which it was necessary to resolve before distribution could 
be ordered. The language of the will and the surrounding 
circumstances, namely that the testatrix was unmarried, that 
she had no relatives of any degree of kindred, that this con-
dition was contemplated by the testatrix, and that she drafted 
the will herself, are deemed to have been considered by the 
court in arriving at the interpretation which would conform 
to the testatrix' intention as expressed by her will. The am-
biguity was reasonably resolved in accordance with the court's 
finding by the language of the will in the light of the circum-
stances disclosed (Prob. Code, § 105; Estate of Seay, 180 Cal. 
304, 306 [181 P. 58]); and the mathematical figures were 
properly disregarded as ~rplusage when a different intention 
appeared by the language of the will drafted solely by the 
testatrix. (Prob. Code, § 106; Estate of Northcutt, npra, 
16 Cal.2d 683, 688.) 
.AJj indicated by this court's decision in Estate of Northcutt 
(at pp. 690-691 citing many cases), where the construction 
placed on the language of the will by the probate court is 
reasonable and appears to be consistent with the testatrix' ex-
pressed intention the appellate court will not substitute an-
other although equally tenable interpretation. 
The foregoing rules of construction and· review are deter-
minative of the questions relating to interpretation of the 
fifth provision in the will. The rules and decisions relied on 
by the attorney general are inapplicable to control a different 
result considering the particular facts of this case. 
[7] The respondents who are the distributees named in the 
) 
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decree of distribution contend that the state was oot an ag-
grieved party and was not entitled to take the appeal. The 
contention is based on the assertion that the state in no event 
~ : could become a distributee since, so it is claimed, Rusaell Lem-
: -mon was named as the residuary legatee to take any portion 
[.Juot distributable to the named organizations. [t was assumed 
~::on the hearing before the probate court that the alternate 
legatee would take only if the bequest to the or-
~riraniza'tl0118 was in excess of that permitted by law and, that 
:'i.~.!ondltl0n not obtaining, any undistributed portion would es-
to the state. It is here also assumed that the State of 
would be a distributee as to one-fourth of the 
residue had the court made a contrary finding on the particu-
issue of interpretation presented by the executor. In any 
of the case, however, the state had a possible interest 
l"'c:lepe'] lld.ing on the interpretation of the fifth provision of the 
and it was a party aggrieved by the decree distributing 
property otherwise. It was therefore entitled to appeal. 
'The decree is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J" Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
l'RAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-In the fifth clause of her will, 
testatrix made three bequests, each representiug 25 per 
'of her residuary estate. Twenty-five per cent thus re-
11111&111ea unbequeathed. It is immaterial whether the omission 
beneficiary was intentional or inadvertent; obvi-
rMiHIlv·the court cannot add a beneficiary. Likewise it cannot 
ltilier'wle the amount of the bequests; the will specifies 25 per 
1IUIo ..... ~A~"t there is no evidence that 33% per cent was intended. 
mtrocloctorv clause, "all the rest, residue and remainder 
estate I give and bequeath as follows," designates the 
. bom which the bequests were to be paid. The legatees 
qwmtnm thereof were specified .. as follows"; there were 
legatees. and each was to receive one-fourth of the fund. 
II1I"I'11"",'"'' is no evidence that testatrix intended ~h8t they should 
receive proportionate shares of the remaining one-fourth 
fun<L . 
·i~ding such an intention into the will the majority 
relies on the presumption against intestacy. There 
I"b<nvE!Ve:l'. "no room for the application of the rule [against 
Im".~) -if -the testator's language, taken in the light of 
~iidiing circumstances, will not reasonably admit of more 
) 
) 
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than one construction. A court's inquiry in construing a 
will is limited to ascertaining what the testator meant by the 
language which he used.. If he used language which results 
in intestacy. and there can be no douQt about the meaning 
of the language which was used, the court must hold that in-
testacy was intended.." (Estate of Beldon, 11 Cal.2d 108, 
112 [77 P.2d 1052] ; Estate of Hoytema, 180 Cal. 430, 432 
[181 P. 645]; Estate of Lyons, 36 Cal.App.2d 92, 95 (96 P.2d 
1018]; Estate 01 SuUivan, 31 Cal.App.2d 527, 529-530 (88 
P.2d 225]; Estate 01 Maloney; 27 Cal.App.2d 332, 336 [80 
P.2d 998].) 
I cannot agree that· this court is bound under applicable 
rules of appellate review to affirm the trial court's interpreta-
tion of the will. The will clearly prescribes the disposition 
of only 75 per cent of the testatrix' residuary estate. It is 
not for the trial or appellate court to rewrite her will by 
enlarging her bequests on the conjecture that the failure to 
bequeath 25 per cent was unintentional and that had it been 
pointed out to the testatrix, she would have divided it equally 
among the three specified beneficiaries rather than have given 
it to a fourth beneficiary. 
The majority opinion relies on Estate 01 Northcutt, 16 Cal. 
2d 683 [107 P.2d 607], for the proposition that "where the 
CIOnstruction placed on the language of the Will by the probate 
fOurt is reasonable and appears to be consistent with the tes-
tatrix' expressed intention the appellate court will not sub-
stitute another although equally tenable interpretation." It 
is conceded that the trial court's interpretation of the will 
was based solely on its terms, without the aid of any extrinsic 
.... evidence .. The dictum of the Northcutt case is not applicable 
to the interpretation of a doeument when there is no extrln-
mc evidence. "Whatever confusion might have existed in 
the law on this subject prior to 1942 was set at rest by the 
decision in Estate 01 Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343 [131 P.2d 825]. 
Since the decision of that ease it is settled law that the inter-
pretation of a document, including a will or a decree, is • 
question of law, and that it is the duty of an appellate court 
in such eases to interpret the document independent of the 
(!onstruction given to it by the trier of the fact, and to make 
• final determination in accordance with the applicable prin-
ciples of law.'; (Estate of Norris, 78 Cal.App.2d 152, 159 
[177 P.2d 299] ; Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 P.2d 
825] ; Westena Ooal <t Mining 00. v. Jones, 27 Cal.2d 819, 
826-827 [167 P.2d 719, 164 A.L.R. 685]; U.w. Oil Co. v. 
) 
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Union Sugar Co., 31 Cal.2d 300, 306, 318 [188 P.2d 470]; 
Estate of Pearson, 90 Ca1.App.2d 436, 438[203 P.2d 52] ) 
The only evidence of testatrix' intention is her will. It 
offers no support for the construction placed upon it by the 
~ trial court and by the majority opinion herein. I would there-
; fore reverse the decree of distribution and direct the escheat 
to the State of California of 25 per cent of the residuary estate. 
